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1 Introduction
The study of how and why ¯rms get started has a rich tradition in the eco-
nomics literature. Knight (1971) views an entrepreneur as someone who ac-
cepts production risk in exchange for the authority to direct other factors of
production; this view is essentially static and helps identify entrepreneurial
activity with the risk characteristics of the population. Kihlstrom and La®ont
(1979) view an entrepreneur as someone who bears risk and receives the reward
for the risk. Schumpeter (1949) thinks of the entrepreneur as someone who
transforms inventions and discoveries into commercially viable processes. Bau-
mol (1986, 1988) and Holmes and Schmitz (1990) focus on the entrepreneur's
role in adapting new technology to create new products.
Our theory of the entrepreneur di®ers from previous theories in one im-
portant aspect: we view the entrepreneur as an organizer of production who
transforms a speci¯c, non-tradable capital into a general, tradable capital.
The entrepreneur is an agent who possesses human capital in the form of
speci¯c skills or talents. When she starts a ¯rm, her human capital is essen-
tial to the ¯rm. If there were no information or incentive problems then she
could write a contract that would result in her supplying her human capital
fully and the ¯rm's value would be close to her private value.4 However, since
human capital cannot be sold or, in many instances, e±ciently contracted
over, the actual value is substantially lower than her private value. The en-
trepreneur solves this problem by transforming her human capital into what
we call \organization capital." The organization capital can be sold as part
of the ¯rm, so that the dynamic process of transforming human capital into
organization capital means that the value of the ¯rm increases over time. By
4 See Wu (1989) for a background on why no one may be willing to hire en-
trepreneurs.2 Atsushi Oshima, B. Ravikumar and Raymond Riezman
this process the entrepreneur uses her speci¯c human capital to accumulate
general, tradable assets.
The process of using human capital to create organization capital is the
focus of our analysis. We de¯ne organization capital to be information, speci¯c
to the ¯rm, which allows the ¯rm to transform technological know-how and
factors of production into products and services it can sell in the market. The
organization capital is thus embodied in the ¯rm and has value.
The dynamic optimization problem faced by the entrepreneur is as follows.
The entrepreneur's time weighted by her human capital is used directly in the
production process to produce output and is also used to produce organization
capital. Organization capital is an imperfect substitute for human capital in
the production process. The entrepreneur must, therefore, decide how much
time to devote to current production, how much to devote to building orga-
nization capital which earns a return in the future and how much leisure to
consume. Given the leisure-work decision, the entrepreneur trades o® creat-
ing more organization capital now, which means that the ¯rm has substantial
value sooner, against using that human capital for current production, which
generates income in the current period. The solution to this dynamic opti-
mization problem pins down the evolution of organization capital over time
and the rate at which the value of the ¯rm grows. As the ¯rm evolves over
time, the entrepreneur transforms her human capital, a speci¯c, non-tradable
asset, into a general asset that is tradable in the market.
We develop and solve a very simple model of the evolution of the ¯rm which
yields a number of results. First, we show that the entrepreneur devotes a lot of
time in the initial stages to creating organization capital but decreases her time
as the ¯rm evolves. We show that the stock of organization capital increases at
a decreasing rate. Finally, we show that the value of the ¯rm (the value withoutEntrepreneurship, Organization Capital and the Evolution of the Firm 3
the entrepreneur) increases over time, gets closer to entrepreneur's value, but
is always below the entrepreneur's value (which includes the entrepreneur's
e®orts to increase organization capital.)
Our idea of organization capital as accumulated knowledge embodied in
the ¯rm, is similar to the type of capital considered by Marshall (1930). In
related work, Rosen (1972) and, more recently, Atkeson and Kehoe (2005)
develop models in which the ¯rm produces organization capital and output as
a bundle. In contrast, in our model there is a trade-o® { the entrepreneur has
to divide her time between production of output and creation of organization
capital. In Prescott and Visscher (1980), the organization capital is embodied
in the ¯rm's workers. In such models, the di®erence between the value of the
¯rm to the entrepreneur and others is likely to be small. In our model, the
organization capital is embodied in the ¯rm and hence, the di®erence between
the value of the ¯rm to the entrepreneur and to outsiders depends upon how
important the entrepreneur is to the future of the ¯rm.
2 Model
This is a model of one ¯rm in a competitive market. An entrepreneur produces
a product and sells it at a ¯xed price. For convenience we assume that this
price is one. The entrepreneur hires labor, l, on the spot market at a wage
w and produces output using her human capital, h, and organization capital,
k, along with the labor. The human capital is relatively speci¯c on several
dimensions; it may be speci¯c to the product being produced, the location
where it is produced, etc. The organization capital is an imperfect substitute
for human capital in the production process.
De¯ne ¿
p
t to be the fraction of time the entrepreneur devotes to the pro-




where F(¢) is increasing, strictly concave, and homogeneous of degree one. We
have assumed that the entrepreneur's human capital h and the market wage
w are constant over time.
The entrepreneur is also responsible for creating organization capital. The
entrepreneur spends ¿k
t of her time producing organization capital. The stock
of organization capital depends on how much time the entrepreneur devotes
to creating it as well as how much is carried over from previous period. The
following equation describes the evolution of the stock of organization capital:
kt+1 = g(¿k
th;kt).
Loosely speaking, h represents the speci¯c human capital that is essential
to start the ¯rm. In this case, h may represent knowledge of how to convert
a blueprint into a new commercial product. Without h there is no product
to produce. While knowledge of computer hardware, programming, networks
etc. is a tradeable asset, knowledge of how to transform this into a marketable
product is not. The entrepreneur not only performs this transformation, but
also converts the speci¯c human capital into a tradeable asset. She does so by
making herself gradually inessential over time. In this process, she faces an in-
tertemporal trade-o®: her current consumption is enhanced by devoting more
time to the production process but her future consumption will be enhanced
if she devotes more time to creating organization capital.
The entrepreneur maximizes the sum of discounted utility over pro¯ts and
leisure. We normalize the total amount of time available in a period to be
one. Assume that the entrepreneur's utility function is logarithmic and that
her subjective discount factor is ¯. Her problem is to choose ¿p, ¿k and lEntrepreneurship, Organization Capital and the Evolution of the Firm 5
each period in order to maximize her discounted lifetime utility. Formally, the














subject to, 8t ¸ 0:
kt+1 = g(kt;¿k
th),
k0 > 0 given.
Notice that her problem does not explicitly depend on the time period once we
know the beginning-of-period stock of organization capital. This helps us cast
her in¯nite horizon optimization problem as the following dynamic program:
V (k) = max Áln(F(k;¿ph;l) ¡ wl) + (1 ¡ Á)ln
¡
1 ¡ ¿p ¡ ¿k¢
+ ¯V (k0)
subject to k0 = g(k;¿kh),
where V (k) is the (endogenous) value of the entrepreneur's objective when
she currently has k units of organization capital, ¿p,¿k and l are current
choices of the entrepreneur's time for production, time for organization capital
accumulation and labor, and k0 is the next period's chosen level of organization
capital.
It is easy to show that there exists a unique function V (¢) that solves
the above Bellman's functional equation (see Alvarez and Stokey ( 1998)).
Furthermore, V (¢) is increasing, concave, and di®erentiable. These properties
of V (¢) imply that the choice variables ¿p, ¿k, l, and k0 are all stationary
functions of k i.e., while the values of ¿, l, and k0 change over time, the
function describing the values does not.




= (1 ¡ Á)
1
1 ¡ ¿p ¡ ¿k (1)
¿k : (1 ¡ Á)
1
1 ¡ ¿p ¡ ¿k = ¯V 0(k0)g2(k;¿kh)h (2)
l : F3(k;¿ph;l) = w: (3)
The Envelope Theorem implies that












F(k0;¿p0h;l0) ¡ wl0g2(k;¿kh): (5)
Thus, equations (1), (3) and (5) describe the economy.
Value of organization capital
Since we emphasize the role of the entrepreneur as one of transforming spe-
ci¯c non-tradable human capital into tradable organization capital, it would
be interesting to know the valuation of the enterprise with and without the
entrepreneur. Our model suggests that the discounted sum of utilities is the
value of the enterprise to the entrepreneur. The value to the entrepreneur with
kt units of organization capital in period t is












subject to ks+1 = g(ks;¿k
sh).
We can also compute the discounted sum of utilities without the en-
trepreneur's time but with the organization capital; this we call the value
of the ¯rm without the entrepreneur or the value of the ¯rm. To compute the
value at any point in time, we set the level of organization capital equal to
the entrepreneur's chosen level at the time and then calculate the discounted
sum of utilities. Since, h = 0, kt+1 = g(kt;0) and xt = F(kt;0;lt) ¡ wlt.Entrepreneurship, Organization Capital and the Evolution of the Firm 7
The value of a ¯rm with k units of organization capital but without the
entrepreneur's human capital would be




s¡t [Áln(F(ks;0;ls) ¡ wls) + (1 ¡ Á)ln(1)]
subject to ks+1 = g(ks;0):
We next calibrate the model to see how it behaves and do some simple
comparative static exercises.
3 Calibration
We adopt a particular functional form for the production function and law of
motion of organization capital.
F(k;¿ph;l) = [¹(¿ph)½ + (1 ¡ ¹)k½]
®
½ l1¡®
k0 = [¹(¿kh)½ + (1 ¡ ¹)(k)½]
1
½
Given these functional forms, equations (1), (3) and (5) become
Á
¹(¿ph)½
¿p[¹(¿ph)½ + (1 ¡ ¹)k½]
= (1 ¡ Á)
1
1 ¡ ¿p ¡ ¿k (6)














¹(¿kh)½ + (1 ¡ ¹)(k)½
(1 ¡ ¹)(k0)½¡1
¹(¿p0h)½ + (1 ¡ ¹)k0½
We next use these equations to compute a numerical solution to the model.
We have a number of technology parameters:
¹{ratio of investment in organization capital to the stock of organization
capital8 Atsushi Oshima, B. Ravikumar and Raymond Riezman
½{substitutability of investment with existing organization capital





Á{weight indicating preference over leisure
¯{discount rate.
The calibration strategy is the following. We ¯rst ¯x the level parameters
h, Z, and w. The levels of these are arbitrary so we set h = 3, Z = 3 and w = 1.
¯ is set to a standard value, 0:96 which typically implies a real interest rate
of 4%. We set ½ = 0:95. This means that investment in organization capital
is a close substitute for existing organization capital. We use the \Survey of
Private Enterprise" to compute the value of pro¯t-output ratio, ® = 0:732.
Output is de¯ned to be net pro¯t + wage payments. We calculate the pro¯t-
output ratio of manufacturing, wholesale, retail, and service industries from
1980 to 2005 in Japan. Using GDP share, we take the weighted average of
these industries in each year and then take the average over the entire sample
period.
Finally, we determine Á and ¹. We jointly calibrate these two parame-
ters to match the steady state hours worked and steady state investment to
capital ratio. We calculate the steady state hours worked as follows. Since
we have normalized the time available to the entrepreneur as 1, we take the
average weekly hours worked in Japan during 1980-2005 and divide by 112
(16 hours each day times seven days). The fraction is 0:368. 5 Our steady
state investment is ¹
1
½¿kh. We calculate the capital stock with the perpetual
5 Source: Monthly Labor Survey issued the Ministry of Labor.Entrepreneurship, Organization Capital and the Evolution of the Firm 9
inventory method.6 We set the initial capital stock to be the same as that in
Hayashi and Prescott (2002). This calcualtion yields the average investment
to capital ratio in Japan from 1980 to 2005 to be 0.1332. The reason we set
organization capital investment to organization capital ratio as the same as
the one with physical capital is because of the research by Corrado, Hulten
and Sichel (2006). They found that intangible investment to tangible invest-
ment ratio in the United States during 1990s is 1:1. With these targets we
¯nd that Á = 0:4264 and ¹ = 0:1473.













Next, using the approximated value function and policy functions, we simu-
late the model for 25 years. The initial level of organization capital is 0.01.
Organization capital takes nineteen periods to reach 99% level of the steady
state which is 1:1. (See Figure 1.)
For the ¯rst few periods, an entrepreneur devotes more than 50% of her
time endowment for work (production + organization capital formation). As
Figure 2 shows, she spends 58% of her time for work in the second pe-
6 Investment data source is \Annual Report on National Accounts" issued by De-
partment of National Accounts, ESRI10 Atsushi Oshima, B. Ravikumar and Raymond Riezman











Fig. 1. Evolution of Organization Capital
riod, which is quite similar to the one reported in the \Survey of New En-
trepreneurs' Activity" in 2002 issued by National Life Finance Corporation
(an entrepreneur uses 55% of her time for work). On the other hand, growth in















Fig. 2. Evolution of Time Allocation by the Entrepreneur
labor (Figure 3) in the ¯rst four periods is much larger than the one reportedEntrepreneurship, Organization Capital and the Evolution of the Firm 11
in the same survey (Model: 553%, Data:71%). As shown in Figure 4, average









Fig. 3. Evolution of Labor Hired by the Entrepreneur
growth of pro¯t in 25 years is 9.8%, which is also larger than the data (2.8%
from 1980 to 2005) reported in the National Accounts.7
In the benchmark case, the entrepreneur stops working at production ac-
tivities after two periods. Furthermore, time for capital accumulation is con-
cave. When the level of organization capital is low, the entrepreneur needs to
work. However, once she reaches a certain level of organization capital, she
stops working on production and also begins to reduce the time spent on orga-
nization capital formation. Figure 5 shows that the value to the entrepreneur
as well as the value of the ¯rm without the entrepreneur increases over time.
The gap between the values narrows, but it does not seem to converge to zero.
7 Source: Pro¯t of Private unincorporated enterprizes in \Annual Report on Na-
tional Accounts" issued by Department of National Accounts, ESRI.12 Atsushi Oshima, B. Ravikumar and Raymond Riezman











Fig. 4. Evolution of Pro¯t















Fig. 5. Evolution of the Values of the Firm
5 Comparative Statics
We do some simple comparative static exercises to examine the e®ect of
changes in ½, ¹ Á and h. We ¯rst look at lower values of ½; ½ = 0:90 and
½ = 0:85. Decreases in ½ decreases the steady state level of investment, em-
ployment and value of the ¯rm. In the simulation, decreases in ½ increasesEntrepreneurship, Organization Capital and the Evolution of the Firm 13
growth of pro¯t. Second, we look at what happens if investment in organiza-
tion capital is a larger percentage of the stock of organization capital (¹ = 0:3
and ¹ = 0:5). ¹ has a strong impact on the steady state level of organization
capital, but the change is not monotone in ¹. Increasing ¹ from the benchmark
value to 0:3 raises the steady state organization capital. But, when ¹ increases
from 0:3 to 0:5, the steady state level of organization capital decreases dra-
matically. Third, we consider a lower and a higher value of Á (Á = 0:3 and
Á = 0:55). When the entrepreneur cares more about income relative to leisure
she works more. Both steady state hours devoted to organization capital and
hours worked towards production increase as Á goes up. Thus the ¯rm grows
faster as Á rises. Finally, we analyze the e®ect of human capital (h = 2 and
h = 4). The steady state level of organization capital and the number of em-
ployees increase as the level of human capital increases. On the other hand,
change in human capital does not a®ect the steady state time allocation. The
impact of the level of human capital on the marginal bene¯ts of time for pro-
duction and investment are exactly the same in the steady state so that the
steady state time allocation is independent of h. Because of our production
function, labor demand is increasing function of h¿p. Since ¿p does not change
in the steady state, increasing h increases the number of employees. Also, the
steady state level of organization capital is increasing in h¿k. Therefore, it
increases as h increases.
6 Concluding Comments
In developing a theory of start-up ¯rms or entrepreneurship we focus on the
role of organization capital. The entrepreneur is able to transform her human
capital into a marketable asset, which we call organization capital, by build-
ing an e®ective business organization, thereby making herself inessential over14 Atsushi Oshima, B. Ravikumar and Raymond Riezman
time. This organization capital can be used by the entrepreneur to generate
future streams of pro¯ts and create value.
Our view is that organization capital plays an important role in determin-
ing the value of a ¯rm. When ¯rms are sold the price the ¯rm sells for re°ects
future pro¯tability. But what is it that the buyer is actually buying? Our view
is that besides the physical assets when you buy a business you are in large
part purchasing the organization capital.
Our model implies that the ¯rm increases organization capital at a de-
creasing rate. Labor demand by the ¯rm (and pro¯ts) also increases at a
decreasing rate. This means that the value of a ¯rm increases at a decreasing
rate.
We think this framework will be useful in analyzing the behavior of multi-
national ¯rms. For example, consider a multinational ¯rm that wants to take
advantage of cheap inputs available in another country. It could choose to
operate a plant in that country, enter into a joint venture with a local ¯rm
or contract out to a local ¯rm. Our model suggests that their choice of mode
of entry into this market will be a®ected by the way organization capital is
created by the multinational ¯rm.
There are many important issues that we have not dealt with at this
point, such as the extent to which organization capital is embodied in people,
whether organization capital can be purchased and transferred to other uses
and to what extent organization capital is a public good. We leave these issues
for future research.Entrepreneurship, Organization Capital and the Evolution of the Firm 15
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Appendix: Data Sources
Harada (2003)
This paper, written in Japanese, analyzes working hours of entrepreneurs who
had set up their business three to seven years before 2002 (so they started
their business between 1995 and 1999). He collected data by questionnaires.
The sample size is 755. He asked the survey participants,
Could please answer the number of weekly hours that you think you use for
your business? For your information, one week is 24h £ 7days = 168h8.
According to his survey, the average number of hours worked in a week is
66. About 87% of the entrepreneurs in the sample work more than 41 hours
a week, 63% work more than 61 hours a week. This is about 18 hours longer
than the average weekly working hours of full-time employees.9
National Life Finance Cooperation
Hours worked \Survey of New Entrepreneurs' Activities" in 2002 reports the
average daily working hours of an entrepreneur who started his business be-
tween April and September in 2000. The interviews were done in August 2002.
The average business length in the sample is 14:8 months. Thus, the sample
is restricted to fairly new entrepreneurs.
The report shows that a new entrepreneur works 10:4 hours a day on
average. About 15% of the entrepreneurs in the sample work more than 13
hours a day. Entrepreneurs working less than 6 hours a day are only 4:2% of
the sample. Furthermore, the number of holidays taken in a month is 4:3 on
8 English translation from Japanese.
9 See \Labor Force Survey" issued by the Ministry of International A®airs and
communications.18 Atsushi Oshima, B. Ravikumar and Raymond Riezman
average. This means that the new entrepreneurs work 6 days a week. Using
these facts, the average weekly hours worked would be about 62:4 hours which
is pretty close to the results in Harada (2003).10 Therefore, we could say that a
typical entrepreneur in Japan works much longer than other types of workers
when her business is in early stage.
There is another interesting feature in the statistics of entrepreneurs' hol-
idays. About 11 percent of the sample do not take holidays at all. The share
of an entrepreneur who takes less than three days in a month is 23:5%. About
a quarter of a new entrepreneurs work 7 days a week at some points dur-
ing a month. This tells us that entrepreneurs' time endowment could be very
di®erent from the usual employees' one.
Employees \Panel Survey of New Entrepreneurs' Activities" in 2005 docu-
ments the number of workers in the ¯rms from 2001 to 2004. They interview
the companies starting in 2001. The average number of workers (including
entrepreneurs themselves) increases from 4:1 to 6:3.11 These numbers tell us
that the employment would increase about 53% in four years.
There is another source of information on the number of workers em-
ployed by entrepreneurs. \Survey of New Entrepreneurs' Activities" in 2003
keeps track of the number of workers at the time the entrepreneur started
her business, and the number when the NLFC surveyed, from 1991 to 2003.
The average lag is 15 months. Hence, the NLFC has data about how many
additional workers an entrepreneur hires 15 months after she started up her
business. The average growth rate of workers in the ¯rst 15 months between
1991 and 2003 is 28%.
10 However, the samples in Harada (2003) started their business 1 to 7 years earlier.
11 The sample number is 849.CESifo Working Paper Series 
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